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BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Commencing on April 13, 1983, a landslide of massive
proportions began moving in an easterly direction down the
canyon toward the Spanish Fork River near the town of Thistle
in Utah County (hereinafter referred to as the "Thistle
slide").

From its highest elevation of 6,300 feet to its

terminus in the base of the canyon at an elevation of 5,000
feet, the Thistle slide encompassed over 6,000 linear feet and
had a width of 1,000 feet.
[hereinafter

(Abstract from Transcript at Trial

ff

Trial Transcript11] , Bruce Kaliser, Record on

Appeal [hereinafter the "Record"], p. 1560 [hereinafter
"Kaliser"], p. 70; Trial Transcript, Joseph M. Olsen, Record p.
1561, [hereinafter "Olsen"], pp. 97-98.)

Experts estimated

that, depending upon the depth of the slide, between 28 million
and 40 million cubic yards of soil were in motion from the top
of the Thistle slide to its base.

(Kaliser, pp. 77-78; Trial

Transcript, James Slosson, Record p. 1553, [hereinafter
"Slosson"], p. 36.)
1983 was an extraordinary year with respect to landslides
in Utah.

Whereas normally the Utah Geologic and Mineral Survey

would expect 10 slides per year, it has been estimated that
between 1,000 to 2,000 slides occurred in 1983.
54, 56.)
clear:

(Kaliser, pp.

The reason for this unprecedented increase was

water.

The four wet years of 1980 through
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1983 were unprecedented in historical times.

1980 rainfall was

119% of normal; 1981 was 142%; 1982 was 163%; and 1983 was
203%.

(Kaliser, pp. 52-53.)

In recorded history, there has

been no comparable four year cycle.

(Kaliser, p. 57.)

Geomorphologic evidence presented at trial indicated
that the Thistle slide developed from an ancient landslide.
The original or ancient slide occurred fourteen to fifteen
thousand years ago with the quick draw down of Lake
Bonneville.

The evidence further indicated that in modern

times, including 10 to 15 years prior to the Thistle slide,
there had been significant soil movement at the head of the
slide which resulted in "stacking" of soils in the upper to
middle portion of the slide.

(Slosson, pp. 21 and 22.)

This

material, because of both prehistoric and recent movement, was
weaker than the material near the toe of the slide which had
not experienced similar movement in the recent past.

(Slosson,

p. 36.)
The record concerning the activity of the appellee,
The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company (hereinafter
the "Railroad"), was not in serious dispute.

In approximately

1880, a predecessor railroad made a cut near the toe of what
later became the Thistle slide for the purpose of running its
tracks up the canyon.

In the course of expanding its tracks,

the Railroad made a second cut in or about 1912 to 1914.
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A

final cut was made in approximately 1951.

Since 1951, no

additional cuts were made and the Railroads' grade remained
consistent until April, 1983.

(Trial Transcript, Blaine D.

Leonard, Record, p. 1562 [hereinafter "Leonard"], pp. 89-90).
It was estimated by Dr. Joseph Olsen, one of the plaintiff's
experts, that the total soil removed by the railroad by virtue
of the cuts made in 1880, 1912 and 1951 was between 10,000 to
15,000 cubic yards.

(Olsen, p. 115.)

While it cannot be stated with absolute certainty what
part of the slide began to move first in April, 1983, the
evidence was overwhelming that the "dominant deriving process"
emanated from the top or head of the slide and moved downward.
(Trial Transcript, Norbert Morgenstern, Record, p. 1554
[hereinafter "Morgenstern"], pp. 22, 23 and 66; Slosson, p. 26;
Kaliser, p. 27.)
It was the Railroad's position at trial that,
irrespective of the reasonableness of the Railroad's conduct in
the construction and maintenance of its right-of-way through
Spanish Fork Canyon, under the circumstances attendant to this
catastrophe, the Railroad's actions or inaction were not a
cause-in-fact of the Thistle slide.

The record is replete with

evidence that, given (a) the extreme mobility of the Thistle
slide mass due to the extraordinary ground water regime, (b)
the highly fractured and weakened strength parameters of the
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"stacked" soils at the head of the Thistle slide and (c) the
immense amount of soil on the move (between 28 million to 40
million cubic yards), the presence of the 1.0,000 to 15,000
cubic yards of soil removed by the Railroad and its predecessor
would not have prevented the catastrophic slide movement.
(Morgenstern, pp. 37-38; Slosson, pp. 36-37.)

Thus, had the

Railroad never run its line adjacent to the Spanish Fork River
at the base of the Thistle slide, the 1983 slide would have
occurred anyway--in the same magnitude and with the same
devastating results.
APPELLEEfS STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Dr. Shroder.
A.

Upon the exclusion of Dr. Shroder as a

witness in the plaintiffs' case in chief, did the
plaintiffs make the requisite offer of proof?
B.

Did the Court abuse its discretion in

refusing to permit the plaintiffs to name a new expert
witness less than two weeks before trial?
2.

The Railroad's Property Insurance.
A.

Did the trial court properly exclude as

irrelevant evidence of property insurance obtained by
the Railroad?
B.

If the trial court erred in its ruling, was

such error harmless?
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C.

Can the plaintiffs complain of any error in

the trial court's exclusion of insurance evidence
where they did not seek to introduce such evidence in
their rebuttal case?
3.

Reference to Maurice Jackson Insurance.
A.

Did the plaintiffs object to any reference

to one plaintiff's insurance recovery?
B.

If such a reference be error, was that error

harmless?
4.

Juror Keith Heber.
A.

Have the plaintiffs made any showing of

irregularity in the proceedings by virtue of the
service of Keith Heber as a juror?
B.

If there was an error, given the 8-0 jury

verdict, was such error harmless?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This was an action to recover damages to certain
residents of Thistle, Utah (hereinafter referred to as the
ff

plaintiffs") resulting from flooding during the Spring of

1983.

The plaintiffs claimed that the Railroad, by its

activities in Spanish Fork Canyon, caused a landslide over a
mile in length and containing between 28 to 40 million cubic
yards of soil to move across the canyon thereby damming the
Spanish Fork River.

The resulting lake formed behind the dam

destroyed homes and property of the plaintiffs.
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This claim was tried to a jury from August 14 through
August 29, 1989.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury

rendered a unanimous Special Verdict in favor of the Railroad
finding specifically that the Railroad's activities were not a
cause-in-fact of the catastrophic earth movement.
1387-89.)

(Record, pp.

Thereafter, on October 6, 1989, the trial court

entered Judgment on Special Verdict in favor of the Railroad
dismissing all claims with prejudice.

(Record, pp. 1492-96.)

The plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, heard on January 3, 1990,
was denied.

(Record, p. 1537.)

This action was commenced on March 10, 1986 with the
filing of a Complaint against the Railroad, the State of Utah,
Department of Public Safety and Department of Transportation,
and Utah County.

(Record, pp. 1-33.)

Complaint was inverse condemnation.

The essence of the

Subsequently, after

numerous amendments (Record, pp. 130-46, 600-01, 702-03), the
plaintiffs were left with but one defendant--the Railroad--and
one theory of liability — negligence.

(Record, pp. 729-31,

734-35.)
An initial trial date of August 10, 1987 was
eventually continued to February 21, 1989.
150-52, 746.)

(Record, pp.

The parties were directed in a Scheduling Order

to exchange witness lists over ninety days before trial.
(Record, pp. 747-48.)

The plaintiffs then sought once more for
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leave to file an amended complaint--their third.

The trial

court granted leave to amend, vacated the previous trial date,
and set a new trial date for August 14, 1989.

(Record pp.

818-821, 870-71, 872-878. )
Following the continuance, the parties were unable to
reach agreement on a form of pretrial order despite the urgings
of the trial court.

On August 1, 1989, thirteen days before

trial, the plaintiffs notified the Railroad that they intended
to call seven witnesses not previously identified by them and
to read from the depositions of seventy-three individuals taken
in separate litigation.
witnesses.

Dr. Shroder was one of the seven new

On August 3, 1989, the Railroad brought a motion to

exclude the new witnesses first proposed by the plaintiffs on
August 1, 1989 and to seek disclosure of the specific
deposition testimony to be read at trial.

The trial court,

after a lengthy hearing, ordered the exclusion of Dr. Shroder
and other witnesses and required that the plaintiffs designate
the portions of the depositions they would utilize at trial.
(Hearing of August 3, 1989, Record p. 1551 [hereinafter "August
3, 1989 hearing"],

pp. 25-26.)

As will be pointed out

hereafter, the plaintiffs specifically refused to make an offer
of proof of the anticipated testimony of Dr. Shroder at the
August 3, 1989 hearing.

(August 3, 1989 hearing, pp. 18-19.)
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Trial commenced on August 14, 1989.

After the

Railroad rested, the plaintiffs offered no rebuttal evidence,
did not attempt to call Dr. Shroder and did not offer any
insurance evidence.

(Record, pp. 1382-84.)

Following twelve

days of testimony, the eight person jury rendered a unanimous
special verdict in favor of the Railroad.

The jury

specifically found that the Railroad's actions were not a cause
-in-fact of the catastrophic Thistle slide.

(Record, pp.

1387-89.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The plaintiffs did not name Dr. John Shroder as a
potential witness until thirteen days prior to trial.

This

occurred even though the plaintiffs were aware of Dr. Shroder
and his relevant work and expertise for many months prior to
the trial date of August 14, 1989.

The trial court had

previously informed counsel for the parties that known
witnesses were to be named by July 14, 1989.
At the August 3, 1989 hearing and thereafter at trial,
the plaintiffs failed to make an offer of proof with respect to
Dr. Shroder as is required under Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.

Further, after the defense had rested at

trial, the plaintiffs did not then seek to call Dr. Shroder as
a rebuttal witness.

In short, the plaintiffs have waived their

right to object to this claimed error.
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Evidence of the Railroad's property insurance for
damage to its line was properly excluded as being irrelevant.
If such evidence were deemed relevant, the plaintiffs waived
any error by failing, after the Railroad rested its case, to
offer the evidence in its rebuttal.

In fact, the plaintiffs

offered no rebuttal evidence.
The reading of Mr. Jackson's deposition testimony,
which had a vague reference to insurance, was so innocuous in
the overall scheme of the testimony as to be harmless.
Further, the plaintiffs failed to object to the claimed error.
With respect to Juror Keith Heber, the plaintiffs have
made no showing at all that Mr. Heber1s presence on the jury
was in any way prejudicial.

Even if the plaintiffs could show

that Mr. Heber should have been excused for cause, the error
would be harmless because the verdict was unanimous for the
Railroad.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION
OF DR. SHRODER AS A WITNESS.
A.

By Failing to Make an Offer of Proof with Respect
to the Anticipated Testimony of Dr. Shroder, the
Plaintiffs Have No Basis for Challenging the
Trial Court's Exclusion of Dr. Shroder.

In order to perfect one's record of error with respect
to the exclusion of evidence, the complaining party must comply
with Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
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In pertinent

part, Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states
unequivocally:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the
party is affected, and . . ., [i]n case the ruling is
one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer. . . .
Although the plaintiffs assert that they complied with
Rule 103(a)(2) (Appellants' Brief p. 9 ) , examination of the
Record makes it clear that no proffer was made.

At the

hearing on the Railroad's motion to exclude Dr. SLr^der as a
witness, the plaintiffs1 counsel made the following statement
(which apparently the plaintiffs now contend constituted the
requisite proffer):
MR. YOUNG:

I finally was able to contact Mr.
Shroder. I don't want to represent
everything he might say, because at
this point in time I've provided him a
significant amount of material, and he
made some preliminary conclusions to me
over the phone, which I would deem to
be work product, but which are very
beneficial to my clients and very
helpful to my case. And if his
conclusions are reinforced by the, by
the depositions and things I've now
sent him, then I would definitely want
to call him as a witness. He's an
expert. He's the guy that wrote for
the Utah Geological Survey the History
of Utah Slides. He's located in Omaha,
Nebraska.

(August 3, 1989 Hearing, p. 19.)
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Under no circumstance does this statement qualify as
an offer of proof.

Not only did the plaintiffs fail to make a

proffer, they purposely refused to disclose even "the substance
of the evidence" citing a "work-product" privilege.

The bold

and unsupported assertion that Dr. Shroderfs testimony would
somehow be "beneficial" to the plaintiffs' case fails to
fulfill any of the requirements of Rule 103(a)(2).
Where no proffer is made, this Court has no record to
evaluate any alleged error.

In State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d

498-500 (Utah 1986), this Court stated:
[W]e will not set aside a verdict because of the
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless a proffer of
evidence appears of record, and we believe that the
excluded evidence would probably have had a
substantial influence in bringing about a different
verdict. Utah R. Evid. 5 (superseded Sept. 1, 1983).
Where it is unlikely that the excluded testimony
prejudiced the defendant's rights in a substantial
manner, the error is harmless and the case is not
subject to reversal.
(Footnote omitted.)
This Court cannot find that the excluded evidence "would
probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict" when it does not have before it a record of
the excluded testimony.

The Record before this tribunal is

devoid of any evidence sufficient to make this determination.
Unlike Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), in
which the trial court had excluded the defendant's only expert
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on the issue of valuation, the Thistle plaintiffs were in a
position to call and did call two other expert witnesses on the
question of causation of the slide--Dr. Joseph M. Olsen, holder
of a Doctorate Degree from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Blaine D. Leonard, holder of a Masters Degree
from the University of Utah.

Both were soils engineers and

each testified that the Railroad's cut was a cause of the
failure.

(Olsen, pp. 3, 53; Leonard, pp. 2, 44-46, 70.)

With

no record of proffered testimony, it may be assumed that, at
best,

Dr. Shroderfs testimony would have been cumulative, and

that his ultimate opinion would be consistent with that of
Leonard and Dr. Olsen.

In Ramme1, supra, 721 P.2d at 500,

this Court quoted State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977)
as follows:
"Courts have found no prejudice where information that
may be brought out by further questioning was already
before the jury either from the testimony of others
or by implication from the witnesses' own testimony."
(Emphasis added.)
Since the jury had before it the testimony of Dr.
Olsen and Mr. Leonard with respect to causation and chose not
to accept their opinion, it would be purest speculation based
upon the Record herein to conclude that the excluded testimony
M

would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing

about a different verdict."

State v. Rammel, supra, 721 P.2d
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at 499-500.

In Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578

P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978), this Court stated:
A judgment will not be reversed for an alleged error
in the exclusion of evidence unless it appears in the
record that the error was prejudicial. [Appellant's]
failure to make a proffer of proof as to what his
evidence would show precludes him from asserting on
appeal that the exclusion was error.
(Footnote omitted.)
The plaintiffs have further contended herein that they
were denied the right to call Dr. Shroder as a rebuttal
witness.

(Appellants' Brief pp. 12-13.)

The plaintiffs have

failed to direct this Court to any place in the Record that
documents an attempt to call Dr. Shroder as a rebuttal
witness.

The reason for this failure is simple:

contains no evidence of any such attempt.

the Record

This Court's

attention is invited to the Clerk's Minute Entry for August 24,
1989 (Record, p. 1384) where at the conclusion of the
Railroad's case it is recorded:
rests."

"Defendant rests-- Plaintiff

There is no entry in the clerk's minutes that the

plaintiffs attempted to call Dr. Shroder as a rebuttal witness.
Further, it appears clear from the Record that
plaintiffs were not foreclosed by the trial court from calling
Dr. Shroder as a rebuttal witness.
pp. 28-30.)

(August 3, 1989 Hearing,

The plaintiffs for whatever reason made the
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purposeful choice of not calling Dr. Shroder in rebuttal.
They should not be permitted to raise this issue for the first
time on appeal in the absence of any objection in the record.
B.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Excluding Dr. Shroder As A Witness On Behalf Of
Plaintiffs.

Even if this Court were to determine that the
plaintiffs have made a sufficient proffer of Dr. Shroderfs
testimony in the trial court, that Court was still well within
its inherent power to control the proceedings before it in
excluding Dr. Shroder from testifying in the plaintiffs' case
in chief.

Unfortunately, in order to discuss this issue

sufficiently, the long and twisted history of the plaintiffs'
delay in pretrial proceedings must be recounted.
Following at least two attempts to amend the original
Complaint and following the granting of several defendants'
motions for full and partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs
were left two years after filing this action with a single
claim of negligence against the Railroad.
set a new trial date of February 21, 1989.

The trial court then
(Record, p. 746.)

In consultation with counsel, the Court also entered a
Scheduling Order requiring, among other things, that witness
lists be exchanged by November 15, 1988, over ninety days
before trial, and that discovery be completed no later than
December 23, 1988.

(Record, pp. 747-48.)

-14-

In January, 1989, as counsel sought to finalize a
pretrial order and to prepare for trial, it came to the
attention of the Railroad's counsel that the plaintiffs, in
attempting to prove negligence, intended to avoid the limits of
the allegations set forth in their Second Amended Complaint by
seeking to prove that actions taken by the Railroad prior to
the major earth movement of April 1983 constituted negligence.
At a January 31, 1989 hearing on this issue, the trial court
gave the plaintiffs1 counsel a choice of either proceeding to
trial without asserting claims of negligence based on
pre-April, 1983 acts or continuing the trial to August 14, 1989
with leave to amend the pleadings to state expressly claims
based on pre-April, 1983 conduct.
870-71.)

(Record, pp. 818-21,

The plaintiffs chose the latter course and, on

February 13, 1989, the plaintiffs filed their Third Amended
Complaint.

(Record, pp. 872-78.)

Contemporaneous with the discussions before the trial
court regarding the scope of the claims, several events
occurred that bear on the identification of witnesses and the
progress of discovery.

On January 31, 1989, the plaintiffs

filed with the Court the Affidavit of Blaine Leonard.
pp. 839-68.)

(Record,

Attached thereto was a report by James E. Slosson

upon which Mr. Leonard relied, and in that report, among
fifteen items set forth in a bibliography, were citations to
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the two articles on the Thistle slide by J. F. Shroder that are
now attached to Appellants' Brief herein as Appendix "A."
(Record, p. 859 at Items 12 and 13.)

About the same time, in a

January 9, 1989 draft of the pretrial order sent: to the
appellants1 counsel, the Railroad disclosed that: it intended to
call Bruce Kaliser, a well-known Utah geologist,, as a witness.
(Record, p. 1049.)

Later, a June 19, 1989 draft of the

pretrial order disclosed that the Railroad would call James E.
Slosson as a witness.

(Record, p. 1063.)

Despite this

on-going disclosure of defendant's witnesses, the Railroad
encountered considerable difficulty in ascertaining precisely
who the plaintiffs proposed to call as witnesses at trial.
(Record, pp. 948-50.)
As a result of this difficulty, on June 27, 1989, the
trial court held a hearing to consider the state of the
parties' preparation for the August 14, 1989 trial date.
(Record, p. 1543.)

At that time, the Court denied the

plaintiffs' oral request for a further continuance of the trial
date.
p. 21.)

(Transcript of June 27, 1989 hearing [Record, p. 1543],
The Court directed the parties to prepare a pretrial

The Railroad objects to this Appendix A to the extent
that the plaintiffs are seeking to indicate that it was
admitted in evidence in the Court below. It was not an exhibit
at trial. Parts of Appendix "A" were relied upon by expert
witnesses in rendering their opinions.
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order and to identify witnesses to be called at trial within
the next ten days.
Record, p. 1027.)

(June 27, 1989 hearing, p. 28; see also
Thereafter, on July 19-20, 1989, the

Railroad completed the depositions of Messrs. Olsen and Leonard
(which had been commenced several months earlier) while the
plaintiffs deposed one of the Railroad's experts.

(Record, pp.

991-93, 1006.)
On August 1, 1989, thirteen days prior to the
scheduled trial, the plaintiffs provided the Railroad with
their witness list.

(August 3, 1989 hearing, p. 2.)

That list

contained the names of several persons, including Dr. Shroder,
that had never appeared previously on any draft pretrial order
or witness list.

In addition, the plaintiffs listed

seventy-three depositions that they proposed to read at trial.
(Record, pp. 1010-21.)

The Railroad moved to strike the names

of the five persons from the witness list and to obtain an
order forcing the plaintiffs to identify specifically those
pages of the seventy-three depositions that they would read at
trial.

On August 3, 1989, eleven days before trial, an

expedited hearing was held on the Railroad's motions.
pp. 1026-1029.)

(Record,

The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs, in

light of the Court's previous orders and deadlines, had so
delayed the naming of these belated witnesses that certain of
them could not be called at trial.
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The excluded witnesses

included Dr. Shroder.

(August 3, 1987 hearing; Record, pp.

1210-13. )
The plaintiffs' counsel conceded at the August 3, 1989
hearing that he knew of Dr. Shroder for many months prior to
naming him as a witness.

The following exchange occurred

between the Court and the plaintiffs' counsel:
THE COURT:

When did you find out about him, from
whom?

MR. YOUNG:

About Dr. Shroder?

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. YOUNG:

Dr. Olson [sic] and I were reading over
Dr. Slosson's report, which is a report
that I have had in my possession for
many, many months, [it] lists about
five people that have written about the
Thistle slide, including Dr. Hinsie,
Dr. Rigby, Mr. Olsen and Dr. Shroder.
When I was with Mr. Olson [sic] on July
the 19th or 20th, I agreed that Ifd
attempt to locate all of those men and
talk to all of those men about the
Thistle slide, because they had written
about the slide mass and diagrammed it
and platted it prior to 1983, some of
them as early as 1950.
I finally was able to contact Mr.
Shroder. I don't want to represent
everything he might say, because at
this point in time I've provided him a
significant amount: of material, and he
made some preliminary conclusions to me
over the phone, which I would deem to
be work product, but which are very
beneficial to my clients and very
helpful to my case. And if his
conclusions are reinforced by the, by
the depositions and things I've now
sent him, then I would definitely want
to call him as a witness. He's an
expert. He's the guy that wrote for
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the Utah Geological Survey and the
History of Utah Slides. HeTs located
in Omaha, Nebraska.
(August 3, 1989 hearing, pp. 18-19.)
Later, the Court responded to counsel's clear
admission of delay:
THE COURT:

. . . But these other witnesses, Mr.
Young, I can see no reason why you can
come in at a late day and say "I
decided to use them" because they have
not been shown to you. Mr. Shroder, if
he was writing papers and his name was
referred to in other papers, that
you've obviously had access to, --

MR. YOUNG:

I have.

THE COURT:

There's the time when you should have
started digging.

MR. YOUNG:

Your Honor, what you have indicated is
true. His name has been available in
other documents and reports and papers
for a long time. There is no question
about that.
I need to make a record in the
strongest way, particularly with Mr.
Shroder. Dr. Shroder, that my not
being able to use him and his expertise
and his testimony about what the
railroad knew or should have known and
what they did or didn't do, is critical
to my lawsuit. It's just as critical
as Dr. Olsen's and Dr. Leonard's
testimony. And I think I'm horribly
prejudiced. These people have the
opportunity to depose him. I'll make
him available. I don't honestly know
the bottom line of all of his
testimony. Mr. Beckwith's been
referring to his reports very favorably
to their side all day long.
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THE COURT:

Well, you have your record, Mr. Young.
I understand your position. And I'm
telling you, in my view, it's too
late. And that even though they give
them an opportunity to depose next
week, then they've got to get experts,
they've got to get somebody, if they
want to counter it, so that you don't
have a reasonable opportunity to
prepare your case, either side. It
seems to me that this is something that
ought to have been done a long time ago.

(August 3, 1989 hearing, pp. 28-29.)
On August 15, 1989, the District Court entered an
order that "[t]he parties may not call at trial any witness not
listed in the drafts of the proposed pretrial order on or
before July 14, 1989."

(Record, pp. 1210-12.)

Thereafter, on

August 28, 1989, the Court applied the standard set forth in
its Order of August 15, 1989 to prohibit the Railroad from
calling its appraisal witness, David Van Drimmelen.

(Record,

pp. 1217-19 at paragraph 5.)
The trial court in excluding Dr. Shroder did not abuse
its discretion.

The trial of this matter had been continued on

numerous occasions.
plaintiffs.

Each continuance had been requested by the

The plaintiffs knew that the trial court's

Scheduling Order for the previous trial date had required the
exchange of witness lists over ninety days before trial.
final date for the trial was set for August 14, 1989.

The

After

over three years of pretrial proceedings and preparation and

-20-

with expert's depositions completed, it would have been
patently unfair to permit the naming of a purportedly crucial
expert less than two weeks before trial.

To take the

deposition of Dr. Shroder (as the plaintiffs suggested) on such
short notice only to learn that new geotechnical theories were
being advanced or that facts previously unknown were being
disclosed would necessarily have required further extensive
investigation and additional study and preparation by the
RailroadTs experts.

To undertake this intense discovery and

corresponding preparation at the same time that counsel was
seeking to complete the numerous tasks essential for adequate
preparation for trial would have caused extreme inconvenience
and corresponding prejudice to the Railroad.
The trial court was mindful of this prejudice when it
stated at the August 3, 1989 hearing:
THE COURT:

Well, you have your record, Mr. Young.
I understand your position. And I'm
telling you, in my view, itTs too
late. And that even though they give
them an opportunity to depose next
week, then they've got to get experts,
they've got to get somebody, if they
want to counter it, so that you don't
have a reasonable opportunity to
prepare your case, either side. It
seems to me that this is something that
ought to have been done a long time ago,

(August 3, 1989 Hearing, p. 29.)
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In Bertrom v. Harris, 423 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1967) the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that the trial court: had not
abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of a Mr.
Jones.

The court found that the proponent of Mr. Jones'

testimony had been aware of the witness for over a year
stated:

"In light of this record, we see no reason which could

justify appellant for the delay in designating Jones as a
witness he intended to call at trial."
Bertram court further stated:
discretion.

423 P.2d at 918.

The

"We find no abuse of

The judge had a basis for finding it inexcusable

that Jones' name was not furnished as a witness by appellant."
423 P.2d at 917.
On June 27, 1989, over a month before the Court's
August 3, 1989 ruling, the plaintiffs' counsel in this action
told the trial court and opposing counsel the following:
MR. YOUNG

Your Honor, we have delineated the
experts and people and individuals that
we do intend to call, in terms of Dr.
Olsen and Dr. Leonard and others . . .

(June 27, 1989 hearing, p. 28.)
Troubled by the seemingly endless delay caused by the
plaintiffs, the trial court then stated:
THE COURT:

The trouble is for reasons that may be
important, [you] put off doing what
ought to have been done a long time
ago. And that in my judgment [that]
isn't any reason to continue this
lawsuit, if you haven't done the
legwork that you ought to have done.
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And you each are entitled to know who
it is you are legitimately going to
call. Do that you don't end up in
surprises. And if you don't disclose
who they are, I suppose the Court, the
only thing it can do is to make an
order they cannot be permitted to
testify. And that's unfortunate.
(Transcript, pp. 28 and 29.)
It can thus be seen that the plaintiffs on June 27, 1989
informed the Court and counsel that they had named their
witnesses.

Further, the trial court informed the plaintiffs

that if they did not expeditiously list their witnesses they
were subject to exclusion.
The reason for this inexcusable delay in naming
witnesses by the plaintiffs became clear at the hearing on the
plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial wherein counsel for the
plaintiffs candidly admitted:
MR. YOUNG:

The Court is aware, and I readily
admit, that my preparation for this
trial was bunched in great extent in
the last six weeks to two months after
the hearing before your Honor in May or
June with regard to the amended
complaint and setting this thing for
trial. Although it is not an excuse,
your Honor, I think that it is a fact
of life that the Thistle people don't
have a lot of money, and to take on a
company like the railroad is darn
expensive.

(Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial,
Record, p. 1563 [hereinafter "New Trial"], p. 5.)
Despite the fact that (a) this case had been pending
for over three years, (b) the Court had entered and continued
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numerous trial dates, (c) various scheduling orders had been
ignored, and (d) the Court had warned of the exclusion of
witnesses if they were not named promptly, the plaintiffs
failed to disclose its witnesses in a timely fashion because
counsel made the purposeful choice of not preparing until the
eve of trial.

If

rial courts are to have any control over

their calendars, the convenience of jurors and the orderly
presentation of evidence, then it cannot be found that the
Court herein abused its discretion.
II.

EVIDENCE OF THE RAILROAD'S PROPERTY INSURANCE WAS
PROPERLY EXCLUDED AS IRRELEVANT TO ANY ISSUE
CONSIDERED BY THE JURY.
This Court will reverse the trial court's evidentiary

rulings only if "it clearly appears that [the trial court] so
abused [its] discretion that there is likelihood that an
injustice resulted."
1979).

State v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah

Such "injustice" is found and reversal is appropriate

"only if the error is such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a result
more favorable to the complaining party."

Cerritos Trucking

Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1982).
At trial, the plaintiffs contended that evidence of
the Railroad's property insurance was relevant to the issues of
knowledge of the landslide and control of the property involved
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in the landslide.

However, the trial court observed that

the Railroad had never denied knowledge of the slide.
consequence, the Court concluded:

As a

"I can't see any relevance

as to [insurance evidence], unless . . . the testimony is:
well, we didn't know anything about this, we had no knowledge
concerning it."

(Motion Hearing, p. 13.)

Thereafter, at

trial, the plaintiffs failed to assert at any time that the
Railroad had opened the door to insurance evidence by denying
knowledge.

Thus, the Record shows that the plaintiffs rested

at the end of the Railroad's evidence rather than offering
rebuttal testimony, including any evidence of insurance.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling
that evidence of property insurance was not relevant to the

The plaintiffs fail to cite any record support for the
assertion that "over a period of years, [the Railroad]
increased its insurance significantly on that particular
section of the track on its railway." Appellants' Brief, p.
15. The plaintiffs are well aware that the Railroad's
insurance policies covered the entirety of its 690 miles of
track. There was no single policy or group of policies
covering any specific geographical area such as Thistle.
Further, the occasional increases in casualty coverage over a
period of better than ten years are more accurately a prudent
response to the inflation of the late 1970's and early 1980fs
and to an improved perception of the potential risks to its
overall operation rather than evidence of a specific perceived
risk at Thistle. (Hearing on Motions in Limine, Record, p.
1552 ["Motion Hearing"], pp. 6-7.)
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issues to be decided by the jury at trial.

In reviewing that

ruling, this Court: is hampered in the first instance by the
failure of the plaintiffs to make a proffer of the insurance
evidence.

Nowhere in the Record before this Court is there any

representation as to (a) what otherwise admissible evidence the
plaintiffs proposed to put before the jury to show the scope of
the Railroad's property insurance coverage or (b) what facts
that evidence would establish.

Absent such a proffer, this

Court has no basis to evaluate the plaintiffs1 contention that
the District Court: abused its discretion.

See, e.g. , Ashton

v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987).
To be relevant, evidence must tend to prove a fact
that is actually at issue in the action.
Rules of Evidence.

See Rule 401, Utah

Applying this standard, the District Court

correctly concluded that evidence of the Railroad's property
insurance was irrelevant and inadmissible.

The Court expressed

its readiness to allow such evidence if the Railroad disputed
its knowledge of the upthrust historically caused by the
ancient landslide.

At trial, the plaintiffs never contended

that the Railroad had denied knowledge of the movement caused
by the ancient landslide at Thistle before the catastrophic
movement in 1983.

Thus, the fact identified by the Court that

might have made evidence of property insurance relevant was
never in dispute.
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The plaintiffs failed to advance any other legitimate
basis for admission of the insurance evidence.

Their brief

herein assumes without explanation that the property insurance
is relevant.

However, the authorities cited fail to support

that position.

In Reid v. Owens, 93 P.2d 680 (Utah 1939), the

defendant frankly admitted that he had purchased liability
insurance as the result of his son's reckless propensities.

In

attempting to hold the parent directly responsible for the
child's wrongful acts, such proof of knowledge was essential,
relevant and not tainted with potential for prejudice.
The plaintiffs cite both Wigmore and McCormick for the
proposition that the policies behind Rule 411 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence should not apply by analogy to the use of property
insurance evidence proposed by the plaintiffs at trial.

At the

Motion Hearing, the plaintiffs' counsel disclosed with clarity
the manner in which he intended to use the property insurance
evidence:
MR. YOUNG:

I believe that the sequence of events,
the railroad continuing to increase its
insurance coverage, the railroad doing
nothing at the toe of the Thistle
slide, knowing that it was a problem;
the evidence, your Honor, is going to
be, and the defendants don't dispute
this, that over the years mother nature
pushed Thistle up over five feet,
pushed it east two to three feet. The
railroad knew about it. They stood
there hanging by their thumbs with
their fingers crossed and increasing
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their insurance on that trackage at all
times.

Because that is a slide that's known,
itfs been documented since the 50's,
itfs documented in the 60's, it's been
on a geologic map. You've got to do
something when mother nature keeps
telling you its coming up. What do
they do? Buy insurance. They
collected 29.5 million dollars.

And I think that [insurance evidence
is] relevant to show that they were
negligent. In other words, that rather
than do anything, knowing they had a
problem, they continued to increase
their insurance, which paid them for
their loss.
(Motion Hearing, pp. 11-12 [emphasis added].)
Simply put, the plaintiffs wished to argue that the Railroad
intentionally bought insurance in lieu of taking steps to
prevent the catastrophic landslide and that evidence of such
insurance is evidence of negligence.
Rule 411 states a policy that one's prudence in
insuring against a potential liability or loss should not
constitute proof of negligence or wrongful conduct.

The

failure to take precautions must be measured against whatever
duty the law imposes, not against a party's efforts to shift
potential risk.

Wigmore notes that "the fact of insurance

covering liability might tend to make the insured less careful"
is an "inference . . . too elusive to be serviceable as
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evidence. . . ."

2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 283 at p. 174

(Chadbourne ed. 1979).

McCormick concurs:

"Hardly anyone

questions the premise that [insurance] evidence is irrelevant
to the exercise of reasonable care."

E. Cleary, McCormick on

Evidence § 201 at p. 597 (3d Ed. 1984).

Wright and Graham

characterize the notion that "the existence of insurance
motivated [a] person to behave carelessly . . ." as an "absurd
hypothesis."

23 C. Wright and K. Graham, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 5364 (1980).

This is the very "hypothesis"

advanced by the plaintiffs.
The fact that Rule 411 applies by its terms only to
liability insurance affords the plaintiffs little comfort.
Rule 411 falls under Article IV of the Utah Rules of Evidence
headed "Relevancy and Its Limits."

Article IV does not purport

to resolve all relevancy issues but only certain "close calls"
such as habit and routine, settlement offers and liability
insurance.

If insurance purchased specifically to cover

liability to third parties is not deemed to be relevant to the
issue of negligence, evidence of insurance for a direct loss to
the insured without reference to third parties can hardly be
viewed as more relevant to the issue of negligence.

Such a

connection is attenuated in the extreme and discredited by the
most respected commentators.
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Finally, Utah law requires that a party appealing an
evidentiary ruling establish the reasonable likelihood that the
ruling affected the result at trial.

See Slusher v. Ospital,

777 P.2d 437, 444 (Utah 1989); Cerritos Trucking, supra, 645
P.2d at 613. The jury's Special Verdict eliminates any
argument that the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine
as to property insurance was material to the result at trial.
The jury's sole determinative finding was that the activities
on the Railroad's property at the base of the slide were not a
cause-in-fact of the catastrophic earth movement: in April and
May of 1983. The jury never reached the issues of knowledge,
control or negligence.

The plaintiffs cannot show that any

permissible use of insurance evidence would have affected the
jury's verdict.
III.

THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO OBJECT TO AND SUFFERED NO
PREJUDICE FROM ANY ALLUSION TO INSURANCE PAYMENTS
DURING TRIAL.
The plaintiffs failed to raise a timely objection to

the Railroad's reading of the deposition testimony of the
plaintiff Maurice W. Jackson ("Jackson") at the time of trial.
One searches the record in vain for a timely objection to the
manner in which Jackson's deposition was used.

"This Court

will not review alleged error when no objection at all is made
at the trial level."
(Utah 1986).

Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 781

See also Rule 103(a)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence.
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The plaintiffs complain specifically of a single
allusion to insurance payments made in cross-examination of
Jackson.

Testifying about the extent of his losses, Jackson

denied that his property was independently appraised after the
slide occurred.

(Abstract from Transcript of Trial, Maurice W.

Jackson, Record, p. 1555, [hereinafter "Jackson"], p. 23.)

In

the face of that denial, counsel confronted Jackson with his
contrary deposition testimony.

Therein Jackson acknowledged

that, after the flood, someone had "listed the replacement
values of the home, I think, as $95,000, and they depreciated
us $19,000, and then they paid us along about $75,000 for
that."

(Jackson, p. 31.)

The plaintiffs contend that this

single exchange, precipitated by and based on Jackson's own
testimony, requires reversal and retrial.
The brief exchange was not what the plaintiffs
represent it to be.
of insurance.
."

Nowhere in the record is there any mention

All that Jackson stated was "they paid us. . .

This does not begin to approach the level of prejudicial

disclosure necessary to make this testimony a basis for
reversal.
Even if the allusion to insurance payments were
significant and even if the plaintiffs had made timely
objection thereto, the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate
that "[t]he exclusion of this evidence would . . . present the
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likelihood of a different result/1
P.2d 1111, 1117 (Utah 1982). 3

In re Estate of Hock, 655

The majority of Jacksonfs

testimony and the cross-examination at issue were directed
exclusively at the issue of damages.

The jury, in resolving

the case on the issue of cause-in-fact, never addressed the
issue of damages.

Thus, as in Hock, supra, exclusion of the

brief mention could not have impacted the juryfs verdict.
IV.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE MADE NO SHOWING WHATSOEVER OF JUROR
BIAS WITH RESPECT TO JUROR KEITH HEBER.
The plaintiffs' concerns regarding Mr. Heber, the jury

foreman, rest on the unsubstantiated threshold assumption that
Mr. Heber had the slightest idea (a) that Mr. Baxter was
involved in the Boyd appeal and (b) that Mr. Baxter was
affiliated with the appellants1 counsel.

All facts in the

Record now before this Court are to the contrary.

Mr. Heber

gave no indication on voir dire that he was acquainted with
anyone from Young & Kester.

In conversation with the Court and

counsel, Mr. Heber was admirably forthright about his personal
knowledge of the Thistle disaster, his scheduling problems and
his general disillusionment with the judicial process.

At most, the reference in Jackson cross examination
would impact only him and not any of his co-plaintiffs.
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First, in response to the Court's questioning, Mr.
Heber disclosed a prior relationship with an expert witness
employed by the plaintiffs:
MR. HEBER:

. . . I know Reed Snarr. He installed
the vacuum system in my house.

THE COURT:

Anything about that relationship which
would prevent you in your mind from
fairly judging this case, if you were
chosen to serve?

MR. HEBER:

No.

THE COURT:

Would you feel comfortable having a
juror such as you, if you were the
position of either of the parties?

MR. HEBER:

Yes.

(Abstract from Transcript of Trial, Voir Dire,
Record p. 1557 [hereinafter "Voir Dire"], p. 17.)
Next, in response to the Court's inquiry whether any
potential jurors had independent knowledge of the Thistle
disaster, Mr. Heber volunteered:
MR. HEBER:

. . . I was returning from Richfield on
that fateful Saturday evening, and via
the Spanish Fork Canyon, and as I came
through there I stopped and got out of
my vehicle and walked down. And that
was right at the time that they had
heavy equipment there at the site
trying to remove the dirt, to keep the
water flowing through that canyon. And
while I was there, they had given
orders to pull that heavy equipment off
of the mountain because the slide was
moving faster than they could remove
the soil. So I watched them pull that
equipment back off, as the water
started filling up into Thistle.
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THE COURT:

Considering that to be so, do you feel
that you still could listen to all of
the evidence that will come before you
as a juror in this courtroom and make
your decision based upon that?

MR. HEBER:

Yes, I do.

THE COURT:

Would you feel comfortable having a
juror such as you, if you were in a
position of either of these parties?

MR. HEBER.

Yes.
(Voir Dire, p. 30.)

Later, Mr. Heber requested the opportunity to discuss
impediments to his service on the jury with the Court and
counsel in chambers.

In that discussion, Mr. Heber disclosed

that he was acting as his own attorney in a domestic matter.
He further acknowledged some difficulty with the judicial
system in that regard.

(Voir Dire, pp. 80-83.)

Finally, in open court, Mr. Heber disclosed the
following about his background:
MR. HEBER:

Keith Heber. I was born and raised in
Utah. I grew up in Magna, until I came
to Brigham Young University. I've
graduated from Brigham Young University
with a bachelors degree and associate
in economics. I'm single. And I have
no children. I work for the Department
of Employment Security as an
aggrievance -(Voir Dire, p. 98.)
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Given this range of candid disclosure and Mr. Heber1s
undisguised desire to be relieved from jury service, there is
no basis to assume that he knowingly failed to disclose any
previous awareness of the plaintiffs' counsel.

Rather, the

inferences to be fairly drawn from the Record establish that
Mr. Heber had no previous knowledge of Young & Kester or Mr.
Baxter.
Nothing that the plaintiffs have placed before this
Court requires a contrary conclusion.

The Reporter's

Transcript cover sheets from the Industrial Commission hearings
filed in connection with the Motion for New Trial do not
reflect Mr. Baxter's name or the name of Young & Kester.
(Record, pp. 1480-84.)

Similarly, the reported decision, Boyd

v. Department of Employment Security, 773 P.2d 398 (Utah App.
1989), makes no mention of Young & Kester or of Mr. Heber.

The

plaintiffs have not demonstrated (a) that Mr. Heber even knew
of Mr. Baxter or (b) if he did know of Mr. Baxter, that Mr.
Heber also knew that Mr. Baxter was associated with Young &
Kester or (c) if he knew of these facts, that Mr. Heber was
thereby materially influenced in his consideration of this
case.
1980).

See Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah
Absent such a showing, the plaintiffs lack the factual

predicate upon which to base a claim of juror misconduct.
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The plaintiffs' counsel frankly acknowledged this in
his argument to the trial court on the plaintiffs' motion for
new trial.

At that time, counsel conceded:

MR. YOUNG:

Item number 2, your Honor, with regard
to the jury foreman. In their response
the defendants say Young doesn't know
what was in Heber's mind, and Young
doesn't know that Heber was prejudiced
against him. My statement to you,
sir, is I do not know that. I have
not talked to Mr. Heber. I suspect
that if I did he would not have
anything bad to say about me or our
case.

(New Trial Hearing, p. 11.)

(Emphasis added.)

In light of this concession, the Railroad respectfully suggests
that this argument advanced by the plaintiffs is totally devoid
of merit.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs have failed to advance any grounds for
reversal of the trial court's Judgment.

This Court should

affirm the trial court's Judgment and award the Railroad its
costs on appeal.
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